We analyze potential reforms to Medicaid financing through the lens of fiscal federalism. Because substantial dollars are at stake, both the economic and political sides of intergovernmental transfers have high relevance in this setting. We show that changes in Medicaid financing formulas can shift amounts exceeding several hundred dollars per capita from "winning" states to "losing" states. In some cases, these amounts exceed 10 percent of states' own-source revenues. States' balanced budget requirements imply that such changes would, if not phased in gradually, require significant budgetary adjustment over short time horizons. We next show that alternative Medicaid financing structures have significant implications for states' exposure to budgetary stress during recessions. During the Great Recession, an acyclical block grant structure would have increased states' shortfalls by 2-3.5 percent of own-source revenues relative to either an explicitly counter-cyclical block grant or the current matching system. Finally, we assess the implications of several financing structures for the extent to which they subsidize states' decisions on both the "extensive" and "intensive" margins of coverage generosity over the short and long term.
ble), while eliminating the matching grant's subsidy of coverage on intensive margins (i.e., the margins that determine the amount of spending on care per beneficiary).
The academic literature on intergovernmental transfers highlights a broad set of conceptual issues related to their design. A first set of issues relate to the incentives intergovernmental transfers create. The central considerations can be summarized as involving a trade-off between creating incentives to provide public goods and maintaining incentives for states to operate their programs efficiently. That is, match rates can be viewed as subsidies that correct for under-investment in public goods (BerndSpahn, 2007) . At the same time, "optimal" match rates must account for distortions to states' incentives to manage their programs efficiently (Smart, 2007) .
A second set of issues involves the distribution of resources across jurisdictions (in the context of education finance, for example, see Hoxby, 2001; Card and Payne, 2002; Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 2016) . Redistribution across jurisdictions can reflect a variety of policy objectives. Relevant "optimal policy" objectives may include a desire to narrow long-run differences in economic capacity or a desire to facilitate short-run recovery from economic shocks (Von Hagen, 2007) .
Both the incentive effects and the distributional effects of intergovernmental grants can be analyzed through a political economy lens as well as through an optimal policy lens. Sato (2007) analyzes the straightforward political economy considerations that arise when designing transfers that redistribute across jurisdictions. Boadway and Shah (2007) and Baicker, Clemens, and Singhal (2012) discuss the political economy implications of using intergovernmental transfers as a means for one level of government to encourage or coerce other levels of government into engaging in particular activities.
Our analysis empirically assesses three features of Medicaid financing reform. We first show that financing reforms have substantive implications for the distribution of federal Medicaid dollars across states. We highlight the dramatic difference between two straightforward alternatives: status-quo block grants and uniform, need-based grants. We first allocate federal funding via "status-quo block" grants that are equal to states' actual federal contributions in 2015. We next allocate the same aggregate of federal funding using an alternative formula. Specifically, we consider a "uniform, need-based" block grant determined by variations in per-capita income across states.
These alternatives differ significantly because of variation in the generosity of states' existing programs. This is due in part to states' decisions regarding the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) Medicaid expansions; ACA related funding accounts for over one third of some states' federal Medicaid dollars.
Many states' federal Medicaid allocations differ by more than 50 percent across the financing formulas we consider. States with high baseline expenditures and high per capita incomes would receive much smaller allocations under income-based block grants than under status quo block grants. New York, for example, would receive nearly $16 billion less per year under the income-based block grants we consider compared to the status quo. Texas, by contrast, would receive nearly $8 billion more under income-based block grants than under the status quo.
In addition to distributive politics, we highlight two under-appreciated issues involving the continuity of state government finances. Budget continuity is relevant because of states' fiscal institutions. Because of their balanced budget requirements, states in which federal Medicaid allocations decline must adjust their finances over relatively short time horizons.
5 Options include increasing own-source revenues and reducing expenditures. The shifts implied by the alternative allocation rules we consider are sufficiently large that the adjustments required to satisfy states' balanced budget requirements would be significant. Fiscal institutions thus provide a rationale for relatively gradual transitions from Medicaid's current financing structure towards any final allocation Congress intends to achieve.
The example of New York illustrates the relevance of federal Medicaid contributions' magnitudes. As noted above, New York would lose nearly $16 billion under a purely income-based allocation of federal Medicaid funds. This amounts to 16 percent of New York's own-source general revenues from 2014. Closing such a shortfall through revenue measures would thus require all taxes, user fees, and charges to rise substantially to make up for lost federal contributions.
Fiscal rules are also relevant for states' exposure to the business cycle. Medicaid's current matching grant structure limits this exposure by automatically increasing federal spending as a recession increases the number of individuals who are eligible for, and participating in, the program. Traditional block grants are acyclical and would not have this feature. Consequently, acyclical block grants would increase the extent to which states must engage in contractionary adjustments in order to satisfy their balanced budget requirements during recessions. We analyze two alternatives to acyclical block grants that would relieve these recessionary fiscal strains.
Reducing states' exposure to the business cycle requires increasing federal contributions during recessions. Block grants could ease cyclical strains if aggregate
Medicaid funding was indexed to business cycle conditions. A simple approach, for example, would be to increase the federal government's contribution by some fixed percent per unit change in the national unemployment rate. We illustrate the implications of this approach in the context of the Great Recession. As desired, the adjustment can be calibrated to make federal Medicaid financing more, less, or roughly as counter-cyclical as the current system. We also analyze a "per-beneficiary allocation" approach that is similar in spirit to the AHCA's proposed changes to Medicaid financing. Because federal allocations rise with a states' number of beneficiaries, this approach is more counter-cyclical than traditional block grants and shares some characteristics with the current system. (1 + g i ).
(1)
Our analysis of the cross-state distributional implications of this funding formula focuses on a baseline of fiscal year 2015. We expand on the cyclical implications of this funding structure in section 4.
Uniform Need-Based Block Grant
We next analyze a block grant design which divorces federal allocations from current spending levels. Under a "uniform need-based" block grant, federal dollars are allocated based on measures of states' need. 8 This financing system would allocate similar amounts to states in similar economic circumstances, adjusted for population, irrespective of their historical choices regarding the generosity of their Medicaid programs (Helms, 2007) .
Our analysis of uniform need-based grants bases federal allocations on variations in states' per-capita personal incomes. We use a measure quite similar to the measure used to determine states' match rates under the current matching grant structure.
Doing so helps isolate changes in federal spending due to financing design from those due to alternative measures of state need. 9 Specifically, the adjustment factor is based on a lagged 3-year moving average of state per capita income (PCI):
10
Income Factor s,t = 3-year moving avg PCI U S,t 3-year moving avg PCI s,t ,
8 Designs of this form have long been advocated by critics of the current funding structure (e.g. Helms, 2007) . Recent proposals, including the Healthcare Accessibility, Empowerment, and Liberty Act of 2016, envision a transition from the "status quo" structure towards some form of "uniform need-based" allocation.
9 Distributions are changed modestly by using alternative measures of funding need. The funding structure we consider is such that in year t with a set of enrollment categories 13 The Medicaid provision within the AHCA is technically a per-enrollee cap on the federal contribution. For a detailed discussion, see Adler, Fiedler, and Gronniger (2017) . The number of enrollees in a state, multiplied by the average baseline federal contribution, dictates the maximum amount the federal government will contribute to a state's program. In practice, the AHCA formula would mirror the current matching structure until the cap is reached, whereupon the effective match rate becomes zero. The federal cap is based on current spending and the federal matching rate is unchanged, implying that incentives for incremental spending per beneficiary would be unchanged by the AHCA until the cap is reached. If per beneficiary costs grow faster than the cap, the AHCA's incentives are such that states will tend to be willing to spend up to the amount associated with the maximum federal match. States would then face the full cost of incremental spending per beneficiary, but would receive additional funding for covering additional qualifying beneficiaries. As emphasized by Adler, Fiedler, and Gronniger (2017) , state cost growth varies non-trivially. States' incentives for incremental spending per beneficiary will thus vary with whether their underlying cost growth exceeds or falls short of the growth of the federal cap.
with C = children, adults, disabled, aged, other . (4) That is, federal funding per category c ∈ C is the product of enrollment and baseline per-beneficiary spending grown out at rate g i . Total federal spending for a state is simply the sum across categories.
Cross-State Distributional Implications of Alternative Financing Structures
In this section we illustrate the implications of status-quo block grants and uniform need-based grants for baseline distributions of federal dollars across states. We show that the choice of funding structure is highly consequential for cross-state variations in the allocation of federal dollars. Because of its significance to this analysis, we begin by outlining the role of Medicaid expansion under the ACA.
Incorporating Medicaid Expansion Under the Affordable Care Act
When allocating federal funds under any of the financing structures we consider, policy makers must ask how baseline allocations will treat spending associated with Medicaid expansions implemented under the ACA. The ACA made federal funds available to states to finance expansions of Medicaid to cover nearly all individuals with incomes at or below 138% of the poverty line. For this expansion population, the federal government initially covered 100% of costs. That match rate was scheduled to decline to 90% over time. Consequently, the 32 states (counting the District of Columbia) which chose to expand Medicaid (as of January 2017) substantially increased the amount of federal funding they received. In 2015, federal spending through ACA Medicaid expansions reached $70 billion, which is roughly 20% of total federal Medicaid spending.
Among expansion states, ACA-related federal funding accounts for an average of 19% of total Medicaid spending and just under 30% of federal spending. These figures vary considerably across states. Figure 1 shows federal expansion funding as a percent of each state's total federal Medicaid funding. In some states, expansion funds make up as much as 40% of total federal funding. The treatment of these funds thus has substantive implications for expansion states' budgets and for the redistribution of federal funds under alternative financing structures. On average among these states, expansion funds are equivalent to nearly 9% of own source revenue. The relevance of these funds to state budgets is underscored by the fact that eight expansion states have legislated that the Medicaid expansion be unwound if federal funding falls below a legislatively specified threshold.
14 In the analysis that follows, we will illustrate key figures with and without the inclusion of ACA-related federal funding.
Status-Quo Block Grants
Under a status-quo block grant, as defined in sub-section 2.1, each state receives a block grant equal to its 2015 federal allocation. Grants of this form would involve perfect continuity with the existing federal matching grant structure in the short term. This structure would thus lock in the considerable existing variations in federal allocations to states. From the perspective of federal policymaking, it is relevant to consider what forces underlie this variation. Existing variations reflect some combination of differences in underlying need, differences in policy preferences, and differences in the efficiency with which states' programs are run. The relative importance of these factors may be quite relevant for whether existing variations are viewed as a socially desirable allocation or an allocation in need of reform.
Uniform need-based block grants
Under a uniform need-based block grant, as defined in sub-section 2.2, each state receives a grant tied solely to its population and to its income per capita relative to national income per capita. Federal allocations would thus be based solely on a metric of need and would cease to be linked to the historical generosity of states'
programs. In this section, we illustrate the implications of shifting the 2015 pool of federal funding from status-quo allocations to the allocations implied by the uniform need-based block grants described by equation (3). shifts from states with high baseline spending levels towards states with low baseline spending levels. This pattern holds using a variety of metrics for state Medicaid spending needs. Because high-income states tend to have more extensive existing programs (on both a per-resident and per-beneficiary basis), they tend to lose funds under a uniform need-based allocation. The opposite is true for low-income states.
We illustrate the magnitudes of the funding changes implied by uniform needbased grants in figure 5. We include ACA-related federal spending for this and all subsequent analysis. Panel A shows that funding changes can be quite large. The District of Columbia, for example, would experience a decline of more than 50 percent, while several states would see their federal funding increase by more than 50 percent.
Between Texas and New York, which are among the larger gainers and losers, the spread in the relative change amounts to $1,000 per capita.
For perspective, it can be helpful to contrast the magnitudes of these formulas' implications with past analyses from the literature on distributive politics. Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) , for example, estimate that congressional districts represented by a member of the President's political party receive $40 per capita more than districts that are not. Levitt and Snyder (1995) Legislators have discretion over the extent to which per-beneficiary payments are connected to historical beneficiary costs at the state or national level. The redistribution that would result from allocating spending on the basis of national average spending rather than state-specific spending would be significant, but less dramatic than the redistribution associated with moving from status quo block grants to uniform need-based block grants. The desirability of redistributing federal funds depends, once again, on what factors underlie historical variations. As before, the relative roles of underlying need, policy preferences, and efficiency are relevant to whether current allocations are thought to be fair or in need of reform.
Political Economy of Static Redistribution
The static distributional implications of Medicaid financing reforms come with political economy considerations. States that gain and lose under alternative systems are not randomly distributed across the political landscape. To better understand the political dynamics underlying this redistribution, we augment Panel A of Figure 5 with shading that indicates states' outcomes in the 2016 presidential election. In the resulting figure 6, Trump states are shaded red, while Clinton states are shaded blue.
Divorcing block grants from current Medicaid spending disproportionately benefits (5):
In the estimates we present, the vector State Traits s includes various combinations of state income per capita, an indicator for implementation of the ACA Medicaid expansion, and Hillary Clinton's vote share in the 2016 presidential election.
Column 1 of table 1 shows that funds would tend to shift from high-income states towards low-income states; an income differential of $10,000 per capita predicts a differential funding change of $320 per capita. Column 2 shows that funds would tend to shift away from states that expanded their Medicaid programs through the ACA; states that expanded Medicaid would, on average, see their funding decline by roughly $600 per capita relative to states that did not expand Medicaid. Column 3 shows that funding would tend to shift away from states that had relatively high Clinton vote shares in the 2016 presidential election; a 10 percentage point higher
Clinton vote share predicts a relative funding decline of $260 per capita. Together, these three factors predictively explain just over 60 percent of the variation in the differences in states' funding across the regimes under consideration.
Transitioning to a Uniform Allocation System
The fact that a uniform need-based allocation would significantly redistribute federal funding would make rapid transitions a source of strain on state government budgets.
Compliance with balanced budget requirements would require "losing" states to implement large and disruptive spending reductions and/or revenue increases over short time horizons. It is thus useful to consider the design of transition rules.
The design of transition rules involves balancing between competing interests.
States with high baseline federal contributions would benefit from slow transitions to alternative regimes. Cushioning these states' losses, however, involves increases in the transition's cost to the federal government. In contrast, rapid transitions will benefit taxpayers in states that stand to gain from shifting to the final allocation.
In this section, we analyze the trade-offs associated with transitions of different speeds under an illustrative transition mechanism.
We model a transition rule that allows states to chose between two options -the uniform, need-based block described in section 3.3, or a status-quo block grant. The uniform block is allowed to grow at rate g 0 , so that Block Grant Under a system where the status-quo block is fixed nominally (i.e. g 1 = 0), it takes a full 16 years before all states would chose to switch to the UNB allocation.
Because of its exceptionally high federal funding relative its per-capita income, the District of Columbia would not transition within the 20-year window we consider.
Excess federal funding under this design amounts to a substantial $440 billion over 20 years, with over $350 billion occurring during the initial 10 year budget window.
We illustrate progressively faster transitions, all of which employ negative growth rates for the status-quo grant. These faster transitions generate progressively lower cost to the federal government. Even with relatively short phase-in periods, however, federal spending is non-trivially higher than under an immediate transition. Under a policy where g 1 = −7%, for example, the transition would take seven years and involve an additional $140 billion in federal spending relative to an immediate transition.
High transition costs reflect the substantial variation in baseline federal funding that we presented in section 3. That is, high spending states have considerable amounts of "surplus" funding relative to low spending states. Consequently, transition costs can have substantive implications for the federal budget.
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In addition to static distributional effects, alternative funding structures have implications for state governments' exposure to business cycle fluctuations. Standard analyses in the tradition of fiscal federalism highlight the federal government's advantages relative to lower levels of government in the conduct of stabilization policy (Oates, 1972 (Oates, , 1999 Gramlich, 1987) . Limitations on states' capacity to engage in counter-cyclical policy are formalized by their balanced budget requirements, many of which restrict the use of short-term debt to finance general fund expenditures.
16
To illustrate the implications of block grant design, we simulate the evolution of alternative federal financing structures over the course of the Great Recession.
The assumption underlying the exercise is that the actual path of states' Medicaid spending reflected underlying changes in need. This assumption is conservative for our purposes. Spending will tend to rise less than underlying need during a recession 16 For a recent discussion, see Bagley (2017) . Research on the implications of states' balanced budget requirements for their responsiveness to short-run shocks includes Poterba (1994) ; Clemens and Miran (2012); and Clemens (2013) . Additional research on the relevance of fiscal institutions for state budgeting practices includes Bohn and Inman (1996) ; Levinson (1998) ; Smith (2006, 2010) ; Smith and Hou (2013) ; Poterba (1995); and Costello, Petacchi, and Weber (2012) . Zhao (2014) highlights that the need for fiscal adjustment in response to shocks is driven in part by the fact that states save too little in their rainy day funds to smooth their expenditures during downturns.
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We do this so that the baseline describes how the current system would operate in the absence of ad hoc interventions by Congress. We net out spending through the ARRA 
Acyclical Block Grants
We first consider the acyclical block grant allocations described by equation (1).
For this section's purposes, the key feature of these grants is that they make no adjustments for fluctuations in economic conditions. For our analysis of the Great Recession, we set the base year to t = 2006. We consider growth rates equal to the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and the consumer price index for medical care services (CPI-M). 
Counter-Cyclical Block Grants
We now illustrate the potential for block grants to incorporate short-term adjustments for business cycle fluctuations. Specifically, equation (6) describes a block grant that increases with inflation and adjusts with the national unemployment rate. We call such grants counter-cyclical block grants (CCB). For a state s in year t, the block grant is equal to,
We again base initial federal allocations on their levels from 2006. Equation (6) augments equation (1) with an adjustment (Cyclical Factor) driven by the difference between the national unemployment rate, U t , and an estimate of its long-run natural rate, U . Our simulation sets the natural rate to U = 5%. The choice of Cyclical Factor dictates the extent to which the block grant adjusts in response to changes in the unemployment rate. In our example, we construct a block grant that is roughly as generous over this time period as was the existing matching grant structure. We scale such that, with the growth factor g t set to the rate of CPI-M, the federal government 
Per-Beneficiary Allocations
Per-beneficiary allocations respond automatically to economic downturns because federal funding expands with Medicaid enrollment. Growth in the number of enrollees is the primary driver of short-run Medicaid expenditures. Consequently, the dynamics of per-beneficiary grants would differ relatively little from the dynamics of the current system. Nonetheless, there are subtle design issues worth considering. In particular, the characteristics of marginal enrollees matter. If, for example, the typical individual made eligible by a recession is healthier than the average Medicaid beneficiary, the per-beneficiary allocation would be "too generous." That is, the per-beneficiary allocation could exceed the cost of the marginal enrollee. The direction and magnitude of selection along these lines has straightforward implications for the relationship between increases in federal funds relative to funding needs.
Additional Cyclicality in State Government Finances
The strains state governments face during downturns stem beyond those associated with their Medicaid programs. Most notably, states' tax bases contract at the same time their Medicaid enrollments rise. We conclude this section by observing that the Cyclical Factor in a counter-cyclical block grant design can be used to stabilize state budgets beyond their Medicaid spending needs.
24
The contraction of revenue bases during recessions places significant strain on state budgets. Estimates of the short-run elasticity of personal income and sales tax revenue with respect to aggregate state income typically exceed one (e. Counter-cyclical block grants provide a straightforward means for easing the adjustments required to stabilize state government budgets during economic downturns.
If revenue declines are of a magnitude similar to increases in Medicaid program needs, for example, state budgets could be stabilized by simply doubling the Cyclical Factor in the counter-cyclical block grant formula. An interesting feature of this approach to budget stabilization is that it would be embedded in the block grant structure as an automatic stabilizer. That is, it could be designed and implemented in advance rather than legislated on an ad hoc basis as an economic downturn unfolds.
Long-Run Growth Rates and State Incentives for Generous Coverage
Thus far we have focused on the cyclical and cross-state distributional implications of Medicaid financing reforms. We now turn to the long run. Over the long-run, the evolution of federal Medicaid financing depends in large part on the rates at which federal allocations are legislated to grow. We emphasize two points. First, growth rates can play an important role in shaping states' incentives for expanding coverage. The financing arrangements we analyze differ significantly in their implications for the rates at which the federal government subsidizes both the intensive and extensive margins of Medicaid program generosity. Among the financing arrangements we consider, only the current matching structure subsidizes the generosity of states' programs along intensive margins. Neither traditional block grants nor per-beneficiary block grants provide incremental subsidy for states that expand the sets of services they cover or increase the generosity of their payments to health care providers.
While per-beneficiary federal allocations do not subsidize the intensive margin of coverage generosity, they do subsidize the extensive margin. On the extensive margin, per-beneficiary allocations thus perform like matching grants; when a state covers an additional beneficiary, it receives an additional per-beneficiary payment. Matching grants similarly subsidize coverage expansions, as each dollar a state spends generates an increase in federal funds. Traditional block grants, by contrast, provide no subsidy for coverage on the extensive margin.
With these issues in mind, we consider the implications of the long-run growth rate of federal funding. The key point is that growth rates drive the long-run evolution of the extensive margin subsidy under the per-beneficiary allocation structure. We illustrate this with reference to the recent AHCA proposal. As proposed in the AHCA, states' initial per-beneficiary allocations would cover roughly 60 percent of the cost of covering new beneficiaries. The proposal allows these allocations to grow at a rate equal to the consumer price index for medical care (CPI-M). This growth rate is slower than projected growth in health expenditures per capita. Consequently, the generosity of the AHCA's subsidy for coverage expansions would decline over time.
CBO projects that spending on Medicaid beneficiaries will grow at a rate equal to 26 GDP growth plus 1 percentage point from 2028 to 2047.
18 Per-beneficiary spending growth is projected to outpace the AHCA's allocations by the rate of real GDP growth.
19 From 2018 to 2047, CBO projects that real GDP will grow at a rate of 1.9 percent per year.
In figure 11 , we present the evolution of per-beneficiary allocations under alternative growth rates. From 2018 to 2047, we project that the extensive margin subsidies would decline from an initial rate of 60 percent to 35 percent under a structure similar to the AHCA. Allocations that grow at a rate of CPI-U would reduce the extensive margin subsidy by over half in the window we consider. Allocations legislated to grow with health care costs would, on average across states, result in a constant extensive margin subsidy rate. As emphasized by Adler, Fiedler, and Gronniger (2017) , Medicaid cost growth has varied substantially across states in recent years. It is thus worth noting that even with a growth rate equal to average health care cost growth, the effective subsidy may vary across states over time.
The evolution of extensive margin subsidies is also directly relevant for the responsiveness of federal funding to business cycle fluctuations. As discussed in section 4, the current funding structure automatically responds to economic downturns as higher enrollment drives spending increases. Federal funding under a per-beneficiary allotment retains some of this feature by rising in tandem with enrollment increases.
It is thus relevant that the extent to which federal funding increases during economic downturns mechanically decreases as the extensive margin subsidy is reduced. If the extensive margin subsidy is allowed to erode, the responsiveness of federal Medicaid dollars to business cycle fluctuations will also erode.
What role does the growth of federal funding play under a traditional block grant structure? Under traditional block grants, federal financing subsidizes states' deci-sions on neither the intensive nor the extensive margin of coverage generosity. The marginal subsidy rate is thus 0 both at present and in the future regardless of the growth rate. With traditional block grants, federal funding becomes a form of foundation aid (Hoxby, 2001) . So long as this funding remains contingent on its use in the provision of health insurance, federal funding effectively imposes a floor on a states' overall Medicaid funding. If it is not made contingent, it may in practice become a form of general fund support. Under block grant structures, rules establishing the population groups and sets of health care services that states must cover are the primary lever through which the federal government influences the generosity of states'
programs. Examples of such rules in other contexts include the "Maintenance of Effort" requirements associated with federal education funds and with the 1996 federal welfare reform.
Potential State Responses To Declines in Federal Funding
Our analysis has explored how alternative financing arrangements affect the overall magnitude and distribution of federal contributions to states' Medicaid programs.
We find that alternative structures can have significant implications for the federal government's contributions over the very short run, over the course of the business cycle, and over the long run. We conclude by considering the channels along which states might respond to such shifts, and in particular to declines in federal support.
That is, we discuss who is likely to bear the incidence of federal funding declines and how that incidence may vary with institutional features of alternative Medicaid financing reforms.
The incidence of declines in federal funding depends crucially on the channels through which states elect to restore balance to their budgets. Options include main-28 taining expenditure levels by replacing lost federal funds with own-source revenues, reducing Medicaid expenditures, and reducing expenditures elsewhere in the budget.
Incidence may thus be born by a combination of those who pay state taxes and fees, Medicaid beneficiaries, health care providers, and the beneficiaries of other programs whose budgets are affected.
Historical experience suggests that a mix of these groups has borne the incidence of adjustments to states' budgetary shortfalls over the business cycle. Surveys from the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), for example, suggest that recessions lead states to enact an eclectic mix of increases in tax rates, increases in fees, reductions in spending outside of their Medicaid programs, and reductions in spending inside their Medicaid programs. Reported Medicaid program changes include reductions in provider payment rates, reductions in optional benefit packages like dental care, and expansions in the prevalence of managed care models.
States' decisions regarding channels of adjustment may be shaped by a combination of political, institutional, and economic forces (Clemens, 2013) . In the discussion that follows, we highlight the range of considerations that may be relevant for states' responses to the funding arrangement envisioned by the AHCA proposal. We begin by discussing the implications of the proposal's purely economic incentives, then consider the potential relevance of political and institutional factors.
The AHCA proposal would convert federal funding into a per-beneficiary allotment that grows less quickly than projected health expenditures. As discussed above, the proposal eliminates federal subsidy for intensive margins of coverage generosity.
States may respond to the elimination of this subsidy by reducing the generosity of both their benefit packages and their provider payments. As per-beneficiary allotments decline in relation to expected cost, the proposal would similarly reduce the federal subsidy of coverage on the extensive margin. States may thus respond to this aspect of the proposal by reducing the generosity of their eligibility rules. The 29 incidence of these changes in the economic incentives associated with federal funding formulas would fall on a combination of health care providers, ongoing beneficiaries whose benefits become less generous, and potential beneficiaries whose eligibility fails to materialize. The beneficiaries of reduced spending would, in general, consist of taxpayers.
Political and institutional factors may have high relevance for states' responses to alternative financing arrangements. Politically, it will tend to matter whether voters view existing benefit arrangements as being excessive, insufficient, or roughly in line with their preferences. Discussions of proposals that reduce long-run funding growth often express concern that the incidence of federal spending declines will fall largely on current Medicaid beneficiaries. This view suggests that many states' voters view current benefits as excessive relative to their cost, and would thus direct funds to alternative uses should federal subsidy rates decline. is contingent on making sufficient MOE contributions. In principle, states were required to spend roughly as much as they did on welfare prior to the introduction of TANF. If a state does not meet its MOE requirement, the federal government's contribution is reduced dollar-for-dollar. In this way, the MOE requirement substantially increases the cost of reducing state spending on the program. Through mechanisms of this form, the federal government can wield substantial control over the design of 20 For a thorough discussion of the TANF program, including funding structure, see Ziliak (2015) .
states' Medicaid programs.
Conclusion
We have assessed the implications of alternative Medicaid financing structures along three dimensions. First, alternative financing mechanisms can significantly alter the distribution of federal dollars across states. Second, financing mechanisms differ in their responsiveness to the business cycle. Third, alternative financing mechanisms have quite different implications for states' exposure to the costs associated with the efficiency with which their Medicaid programs deliver benefits and with expansions of their programs' generosity.
We conclude by connecting these issues to classic themes from the literature on fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972 (Oates, , 1999 . Oates (1999) Our analysis illustrates how the design of federal transfers shapes states' incentives, and is thus an important determinant of the generosity of the redistribution that occurs through states' Medicaid programs. Society's commitment to financing 21 Limitations on states' stabilization efforts stem from both their balanced budget requirements and the policy instruments at their disposal. Limitations on states' redistributive efforts relate to migration. That is, individuals can move to and from localities based on the structure or generosity of social programs.
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this redistribution is an issue that must be settled through the political process. We thus conclude by observing that fiscal federalism's prescriptive content can only take our analysis so far. AK  AL  FL  GA  ID  KS  LA  ME  MO  MS  MT  NC  NE  OK  SC  SD  TN  TX  UT  VA  WI  WY  PA  IN  DC  VT  NY  OH  WV  AZ  NH  MA  IA  MN  MI  DE  RI  IL  CT  CO  MD  AR  NJ  ND  NM  CA  NV  HI  KY  OR This figure illustrates federal spending associated with alternative transition rules from status-quo allocations to uniform, need-based block grants as described in section 3.6. Panel A illustrates aggregate federal funding under each scenario, while Panel B shows the difference between federal funding with an immediate transition, which is revenue neutral by construction. Under this transition rule, states are offered the choice between the uniform, need-based block or a status-quo block. Transition rules all assume the uniform, need-based block grows at rate g 0 = 3.4%, which is the CBO estimate for long-run growth of Medicaid cost. Transition alternatives differ in the choice of g 1 -the rate of growth of the status-quo allotment. Note: +, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels respectively. This table presents estimates of equations (5). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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